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In the Shadow of a Myth:
Bargaining for Same-Sex Divorce
NOA BEN-ASHER*
This Article explores a relatively new phenomenon in family law: same-
sex divorce. The Article’s central claim is that parties to the first wave 
of same-sex divorces are not effectively bargaining against the 
backdrop of legal dissolution rules that would govern in the absence of 
an agreement. In other words, to use Robert Mnookin and Lewis 
Kornhauser’s terminology, they are not “bargaining in the shadow of 
the law.” Instead, the Article argues, many same-sex couples today 
bargain in the shadow of a myth that same-sex couples are 
egalitarian—that there are no vulnerable parties or power differentials
in same-sex divorce. 
The Article shows how a myth of egalitarianism undermines current 
bargaining for same-sex divorce. First, the myth leads to what the 
Article calls “divorce exceptionalism,” that is, when a party claims that 
existing marriage dissolution rules do not apply in same-sex divorce 
because they were designed to remedy the nonegalitarian conditions of 
different-sex marriages. Divorce exceptionalism disables effective 
bargaining because without default legal rules there is nothing to guide 
the bargaining process. Second, the myth of egalitarianism eliminates 
key bargaining chips: under a presumption of formal equality neither 
party really has anything to “give” or “get” in the bargain for divorce. 
Finally, the myth, combined with the general fog of uncertainty 
regarding how courts will treat same-sex divorces, may lead to 
increased strategic behavior. The Article proposes a realistic solution, 
arguing that the legal actors who participate in same-sex divorce, 
including lawyers, mediators, courts, and the parties themselves, should 
reject divorce exceptionalism and apply ordinary divorce rules. It also 
proposes to protect vulnerable parties by extending to same-sex divorce 
the current trend toward joint-custody presumptions. 
The myth of egalitarianism in same-sex couples, which was quite helpful 
in achieving marriage equality, is now haunting the first wave of same-
sex divorces and harming vulnerable parties. It is time to let it go and 
address the reality of same-sex relationships.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Same-sex divorce is often perceived as a shattering of a civil-rights dream.1
More importantly, it poses a serious puzzle for family law. Now that the fight 
for marriage equality is seemingly over,2 and same-sex couples are marrying in 
                                                                                                                     
1 See, e.g., Frederick Hertz et al., Integrated Approaches To Resolving Same-Sex 
Dissolutions, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 123, 125 (“[A] break-up may expose a previously 
unacknowledged disconnect between one partner’s motivation for registering and the legal 
consequences of a dissolution, especially in light of the extent to which marriage was viewed 
as a civil rights fight by gay couples . . . .”); Jesse Green, From “I Do” to “I’m Done,” N.Y.
MAG. (Feb. 24, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/gay-divorce-2013-3/ [https://perma.cc/
M3W4-UCL9] (“One of the things—besides the law—that may make divorce especially 
difficult for gay people is the way it seems to prove . . . old slurs about their relative inability 
to maintain stable bonds.”); Meredith Maran, I Got Gay Married. I Got Gay Divorced. I 
Regret Both., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/opinion/sunday/
i-got-gay-married-i-got-gay-divorced-i-regret-both.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/X6SJ-H8LB]
(“Divorce felt like more than a betrayal of my wedding vows. It was a betrayal of my people 
and our cause.”). 
2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding that the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee same-sex couples the 
right to marry); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (holding that 
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large numbers,3 it is time to address same-sex divorce. This Article identifies a
puzzle that stems from a legal reality in which divorces are subject to court-
approved private ordering.4 Divorcing couples in the United States “bargain in 
the shadow of the law,”5 meaning that the private ordering for divorce takes 
place against the backdrop of legal dissolution rules.6 These rules—regarding 
property, spousal and child support, and custody and visitation—govern in the 
absence of an agreement between the divorcing parties.7 This Article argues that 
many same-sex couples today are poorly positioned to bargain effectively in the 
shadow of the law because a myth blurs their vision.8 They view their 
                                                                                                                     
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Fifth Amendment). But see First 
Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. § 3 (2017) (“[T]he Federal Government 
shall not take any discriminatory action against a person . . . on the basis that such person 
believes . . . that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one 
woman . . . .”); Mark Joseph Stern, Is Same-Sex Marriage Safe?, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/03/will_the_texas_su
preme_court_roll_back_marriage_equality.html [https://perma.cc/9GLE-EH69] (discussing 
a pending case in Texas where petitioners argue that the constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage is valid). 
3 Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriages Up One Year After Supreme Court Verdict,
GALLUP NEWS (June 22, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/193055/sex-marriages-one-
year-supreme-court-verdict.aspx?g_source=Social%20Issues&g_medium=newsfeed&g_
medium=newsfeed&g_campaign=tiles [https://perma.cc/2YRS-SDJT] (finding the number 
of same-sex couples that are married jumped from 38% pre-Obergefell to 49% post-
Obergefell). 
4 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) [hereinafter Bargaining in the 
Shadow] (arguing in favor of a framework that provides divorcing couples the ability to 
determine their postdissolution rights and responsibilities in the form of private order instead 
of a system that favors a top-down approach); see also Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law 
Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 320 (2016) (examining the relationships between 
structural pluralism and private ordering); Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law,
23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 249, 249 (2010) (providing an overview of the changes and 
limits to private ordering in American family law); Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: 
(Non-) Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2331 
(2016) (describing the bargaining calculus that has come with the rise of no-fault divorce); 
Deborah A. Widiss, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: New Possibilities for 
Research on the Role of Marriage Law in Household Labor Allocation, 8 J. FAM. THEORY &
REV. 10, 14 (2016) (finding that liberalization of divorce law has affected household labor 
allocation). 
5 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 968.
6 Id. at 969.
7 Id. at 959. 
8 But see Jeremy Feigenbaum, Note, Bargaining in the Shadow of the “Law?”—The 
Case of Same-Sex Divorce, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 245, 263 (2015) (“If the [Supreme] 
Court [legalizes same-sex marriage], then a divorcing same-sex couple would be able to 
‘Bargain in the Shadow of the Law’ exactly as Mnookin and Kornhauser described thirty-
five years ago.”).
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relationships as egalitarian even when in reality they are not.9 They 
consequently bargain for divorce in the shadow of a myth of egalitarianism—
not in the shadow of legal dissolution rules. 
Scholars have long observed that different-sex couples in the United States 
negotiate for divorce mostly based on the reality of their finances, childcare 
preferences,10 and with at least some background attitudes of protecting 
vulnerable parties (typically women).11 This Article argues that, by contrast, 
many same-sex couples today negotiate under a false presumption of 
egalitarianism.12 That is, a presumption that there are no vulnerable parties or 
power differentials in same-sex marriages. The Article refers to this 
phenomenon as the “Myth of Egalitarianism.”13 To clarify, the term “myth”
does not imply that same-sex couples never want or achieve egalitarianism.14
Data shows that many same-sex couples indeed strive for egalitarian 
relationships.15 True equality, however, is hard to achieve.16
                                                                                                                     
9 I use the term “egalitarian” in this Article broadly to represent perceptions of equality 
between spouses in matters of household, children, financial, and general decision-making. 
10 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 959–62.
11 Id.
12 See infra Part II; see also Suzanne A. Kim & Edward Stein, Gender in the Context 
of Same-Sex Divorce and Relationship Dissolution, 56 FAM. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(on file with the author) (discussing how gender may continue to play a role in dissolution 
of same-sex unions, especially in grounds for dissolution, finances, custody, and the social 
experience of divorce).
13 For a definition of myth, see for example, ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 109 
(Annette Lavers trans., Hill and Wang 1984) (1957) (“Myth is a type of speech. Of course, it 
is not any type: language needs special conditions in order to become myth . . . at the start is 
that myth is a system of communication . . . since myth is a type of speech, everything can 
be a myth provided it is conveyed by a discourse. . . . Every object in the world can pass 
from a closed, silent existence to an oral state, open to appropriation by society . . . .”). 
14 See CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON, NO PLACE LIKE HOME 176–77 (1999); see also 
Lawrence A. Kurdek, The Allocation of Household Labor by Partners in Gay and Lesbian 
Couples, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 132, 132–33 (2007) (finding that same-sex couples distribute 
household chores more equitably based on interest in household labor and that satisfaction 
with the equitable distribution of labor provided more satisfaction and stability “through 
perceived equality in the relationship”); Sondra E. Solomon et al., Money, Housework, Sex, 
and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples in Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil Unions, and 
Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561, 572 (2005) (“[W]e found lesbian and gay 
male couples to be more egalitarian than heterosexual couples.”); Interview by Lourdes 
Garcia-Navarro, NPR, with Robert-Jay Green, Founder & Senior Researcher, Rockway Inst.
for LGBT Psychology & Pub. Policy (Dec. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Same-Sex Couples], 
https://www.npr.org/2014/12/29/373835114/same-sex-couples-may-have-more-egalitarian-
relationships [https://perma.cc/FP88-FCW8] (“[S]ame-sex couples tend to be much more 
egalitarian in their relationships. They share decision-making more equally, finances more 
equally, housework more equally, childcare more equally. . . . [S]ame-sex couples are 
dramatically more equal in the way they function together as a couple compared to 
heterosexual couples.”). 
15 See CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 177.
16 See infra Part II.B. 
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In Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law,17 Robert Mnookin and Lewis 
Kornhauser convincingly argued that private bargaining for divorce is desirable 
because it reduces time, costs of litigation, acrimony, and legal uncertainty.18
The main legal consequences of divorce involve distribution of marital property, 
spousal support, child support, child custody, and visitation.19 Mnookin and 
Kornhauser observed that marital property, spousal support, and child support 
“are all basically problems of money,”20 and “money and custody issues are 
inextricably linked.”21 They argued that “over some range of alternatives, each 
parent may be willing to exchange custodial rights and obligations for income 
or wealth.”22 The gist of the divorce bargain, in their view, is that parties will 
typically exchange parenting time for money and vice versa.23
This Article argues that bargaining in the shadow of a myth of 
egalitarianism may cause three adverse effects in same-sex divorces. First, the 
myth may lead one party (typically the financially stronger one) to claim that 
marriage dissolution rules do not apply to same-sex divorces because these rules 
were designed for different-sex marriages.24 The Article calls this type of claim 
“divorce exceptionalism,” and argues that it harms effective bargaining for 
divorce.25 Second, the myth of egalitarianism skews the “money for kids”
exchange described above because under a presumption of overall equality 
between the ex-spouses, neither party has anything to “give” or “get” in the 
bargaining process.26 Finally, the myth, combined with the general fog of 
                                                                                                                     
17 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 950. 
18 Id. at 974.
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 959; see also id. at 960 (“From the economic perspective of bargaining spouses, 
alimony and child support seem fungible: both involve periodic money payments and, 
indeed, will often be paid by a single check from the noncustodial parent. . . . Consequently, 
child-support payments that are used for housing and feeding the child will inevitably inure 
to the benefit of the custodial spouse.”).
21 Id. at 960.
22 Id. at 964 (“[A]nd parents may tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as a means 
of enforcing their rights without resort to court.”).
23 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 964.
24 See, for example, NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S
SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND 1780–1835, at 197 (1977) for a discussion of the idea of separate 
spheres of men and women.
25 Legal exceptionalism in this context has some conceptual resemblance to 
exceptionalist claims in other legal domains such as national security or current claims for 
religious exemptions from women’s reproductive health or gay rights. In all of these 
contexts, a legal actor claims that general legal norms do not apply to them because of a 
special condition. See generally Noa Ben-Asher, Faith-Based Emergency Powers, 41 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040902 [https://perma.cc/AV7U-
TP3L].
26 See Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 967 (“Some parents with limited 
child-rearing responsibilities may be willing to sacrifice money for additional custody up to 
a certain point; but once they have ‘enough’ custody, they may be willing to give up money 
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uncertainty regarding how courts will treat same-sex divorces, may lead to 
increased strategic or aggressive behavior of one or both parties.27
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II contrasts the myth of 
egalitarianism with data regarding the real lives of same-sex couples. Part II.A 
introduces the myth, which has proliferated since the 1980s through academic 
discussions, studies, news media, LGBT activism, and other such domains. It 
shows how prevalent and celebrated the myth has become, especially after the 
Supreme Court’s rulings on marriage equality.28 Part II.B examines empirical 
data that shows that egalitarianism in same-sex couples is rarely achieved. 
Part III explores some effects of the myth of egalitarianism on current same-
sex divorces. It begins with a discussion of Mnookin and Kornhauser’s theory 
of bargaining in the shadow of the law (Part III.A),29 and proceeds to examine 
how the myth impacts current bargaining for same-sex divorces (Part III.B). Part 
III.B.1 examines the new phenomenon of divorce exceptionalism, and argues 
that it jeopardizes the entire bargaining process for same-sex divorce. Part 
III.B.2 analyzes how the myth may skew the bargaining chips of “children for 
money” in negotiations for divorce. Part III.B.3 argues that these two effects, 
combined with legal uncertainty around this new area of law, may increase 
strategic or aggressive behavior in same-sex divorces. 
Part IV proposes a pragmatic and realistic approach to same-sex divorces 
that does not rely on myth. Part IV.A argues that once the myth of egalitarianism 
is debunked, the range of legal actors who participate in same-sex divorces—
lawyers, mediators, courts, and the parties themselves—must reject divorce 
exceptionalism and instead apply ordinary divorce rules. Part IV.B proposes 
extending the current shift toward joint-custody presumptions to same-sex 
divorces in order to reduce bluffs and threats regarding parenting rights. A brief 
conclusion follows.
II. A MYTH OF EGALITARIANISM IN SAME-SEX HOUSEHOLDS 
A. Myth 
There is a myth that same-sex households are egalitarian.30 The gendered 
power dynamics often present in different-sex couples, according to this myth, 
                                                                                                                     
to avoid additional responsibility. For other parents, no amount of money can adequately 
compensate for a reduction in custody below a certain minimum level. Above that point, 
however, trade-offs between money and custody would be consistent with their tastes.”). 
27 See, e.g., Julie Compton, For Same-Sex Couples, Divorce Is a Legal Nightmare,
NBCNEWS: NBC OUT (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/some-same-
sex-couples-divorce-legal-nightmare-n643891 [https://perma.cc/879C-NNAJ].
28 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
29 See Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 959.
30 Christopher Carrington identified this myth as early as 1999. See CARRINGTON, supra 
note 14, at 177.
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are absent in same-sex couples. Without the traditional sex-based division of
labor, same-sex couples allegedly create egalitarian unions.31 The myth of 
same-sex egalitarianism first appeared in academic literature in the 1980s when 
researchers sought to educate the public about homosexuality.32 In a 
representative study in 1991, one researcher introduced “another pattern [that] 
is based on friendship or peer relations, with partners being similar in age and 
emphasizing companionship, sharing, and equality in the relationship.”33 The 
author argued that most “contemporary homosexual relationships . . . are 
relationships patterned after friendship,”34 and concluded that “[t]he fact that 
many lesbians and gay men are able to create satisfying love relationships that 
are not based on complementary, gender-linked role differentiation challenges 
the popular view that such masculine-feminine differences are essential to adult 
love relationships.”35 Other studies repeated such findings of egalitarianism in 
same-sex relationships.36
                                                                                                                     
31 Rebecca Solnit, More Equal than Others, FIN. TIMES (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.ft.com/content/99659a2a-c349-11e2-9bcb-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/HZN8-
QHD5] (“Gay men and lesbians have already opened up the question of what qualities and 
roles are male and female in ways that can be liberating for straight people. When they marry, 
the meaning of marriage is likewise opened up. No hierarchical tradition underlies their 
union.”). For examples of early researchers who took this position, see PHILIP BLUMSTEIN &
PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983); Jean M. Lynch & Mary Ellen Reilly, Role 
Relationships: Lesbian Perspectives, 12 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 53–69 (1986); Letitia Anne 
Peplau & Susan D. Cochran, Value Orientations in the Relationships of Gay Men, in GAY
RELATIONSHIPS 195, 195–216 (John P. DeCecco ed., 1988).
32 BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 14; Lynch & Reilly, supra note 31;
Letitia Anne Peplau, Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 177, 177–96 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich 
eds., 1991); Peplau & Cochran, supra note 31, at 195–216.
33 Peplau, supra note 32, at 184.
34 Id. at 184–85. Others, however, argue that the “friendship” argument does little to 
support the marriage quality argument. See Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality,
34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37, 59–60 (2011) (“[F]riendship does little to join the marriage 
critique with the marriage equality case. Instead, it pursues only the marriage critique by 
proposing a relational paradigm that stands separate and apart from marriage. . . . [T]he 
move to friendship does nothing to further the marriage equality cause.”).
35 Peplau, supra note 32, at 185.
36 E.g., Kurdek, supra note 14, at 132 (finding that same-sex couples distribute 
household chores more equitably based on interest in household labor and that satisfaction 
with the equitable distribution of labor provided more satisfaction and stability “through 
perceived equality in the relationship”); Solomon et al., supra note 14, at 572 (“[W]e found 
lesbian and gay male couples to be more egalitarian than heterosexual couples.”); Same-Sex 
Couples, supra note 14 (“[W]hat we found consistently in our research is that same-sex 
couples tend to be much more egalitarian in their relationships. They share decision-making 
more equally, finances more equally, housework more equally, childcare more equally. 
Basically, [in] every dimension we looked at, same-sex couples are dramatically more equal 
in the way they function together as a couple compared to heterosexual couples.”). But see 
Nicole Civettini, Housework As Non-Normative Gender Display Among Lesbians and Gay 
Men, 74 SEX ROLES 206, 215 (2015) (“[T]here are important differences in the way that gay 
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Some even hoped that same-sex egalitarianism would improve the 
institution of marriage altogether. In 1991, Nan Hunter argued that marriage-
equality could potentially challenge traditional gender norms in different-sex 
marriages.37 Hunter reassured that a desire for same-sex marriage is not “a
desire merely to become accepted on the same terms within an unchallenged 
structure of marriage.”38 Instead, “it conveys an active intent to disconnect 
power from gender and an adversary relationship to dominance . . . [and] 
transform both the law and the reality of personal relationships.”39 Same-sex 
couples, in other words, would not necessarily assimilate into the gendered 
institution of marriage.40 Hunter and others aspired that “[t]he most widely felt 
impact of legalization of lesbian and gay marriage would derive from its 
potential to remove gender from the definition of marriage.”41 The hope was 
that same-sex marriages would make different-sex marriages more egalitarian. 
Later advocates for marriage equality further utilized the myth of 
egalitarianism,42 and after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and 
                                                                                                                     
men and lesbians divide housework, specifically that stereotypical, gendered traits were a 
factor for both men and women, but in divergent ways. Although both avoided the 
housework patterns expected of their sex, gay men used housework as a way to display 
stereotypical femininity, and lesbians used housework avoidance as a way to display 
stereotypical masculinity.”); Abbie E. Goldberg, “Doing” and “Undoing” Gender: The 
Meaning and Division of Housework in Same-Sex Couples, 5 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 85, 
100 (2013) (stating “egalitarianism is not the equivalent of undoing gender, and nor is a 
segregated division of labor necessarily the equivalent of inequality,” rather, same-sex 
couples may view their arrangements as pragmatic and chosen within the context of their 
relationship).
37 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 9, 12 (1991).
38 Id. at 29.
39 Id. at 30.
40 Id. at 19–20. But see Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,
in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401, 401–06 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) 
(characterizing the movement to marriage-equality as assimilationist). 
41 Hunter, supra note 37, at 30. But see Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask 
for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of 
Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1993) (“[H]istorical and 
anthropological evidence contradicts any assumption that ‘gender dissent’ is inherent in 
marriage between two men or two women. . . . Although both partners were biologically of 
the same sex, one partner tended to assume the characteristics and responsibilities of the 
opposite gender, with both partners then acting out their traditional gender roles.”). Indeed, 
the rhetoric of Windsor and Obergefell support, at the very least, Polikoff’s prediction that 
marriage equality would elevate (rather than critique) the gendered institution of marriage. 
See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual,
37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 243–44 (2014).
42 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1487–88 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of 
Posner’s Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 356–57
(1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992)) (“[S]ame-sex marriage 
would contribute to the erosion of gender-based hierarchy within the family, because in a 
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Obergefell,43 the media also perpetuated and celebrated this myth.44 It was even 
suggested that same-sex couples are happier and better at fighting than their 
different-sex counterparts.45 Overall, in the United States, the myth of 
egalitarianism in same-sex couples has played a key role in the gradual 
acceptance of same-sex couples into the mainstream of society. 
                                                                                                                     
same-sex marriage there can be no division of labor according to gender. Partly for this 
reason, accounts of contemporary same-sex homes and families suggest that, generally, they 
enjoy greater freedom from hierarchy than do different-sex homes and families.”). Contra 
Kim, supra note 34, at 75 (“Same-sex marriage holds the potential not only to transform 
marriage internally but also to alter marriage’s ‘place in law and society.’”). 
43 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (finding that the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
guarantee same-sex couples the right to marry); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2695 (2013) (holding that Section 3 of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act violates “the 
liberty of the . . . Fifth Amendment of the Constitution”). 
44 See, e.g., John Ersing, Applying Gender Roles to Same-Sex Couples, THOUGHT 
CATALOG (Mar. 2, 2015), http://tcat.tc/1vUp6Dv [https://perma.cc/WYX9-LG2Z] (gay men 
are “hyperaware of traditional gender roles and the bearing that they have on public 
recognition of their own sexuality,” but because there are no preconceived notions about how 
same-sex couples should act, they enjoy a clean slate to set their own traditions); Susan 
Donaldson James, When Gender Goes, Happiness Blooms in Marriage, ABC NEWS (July 3, 
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/sex-marriage-gender-disappears-happiness-blooms/story?
id=19560588 [https://perma.cc/SWQ2-T4PT] (using the experience of two same-sex couples 
to demonstrate non-gendered labor division); Tara Parker-Pope, Gay Unions Shed Light on 
Gender in Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/health/
10well.html [https://perma.cc/RY3J-PNWG] (observing that gay couples enjoy more happiness 
due to a more egalitarian structure between the partners than heterosexual couples, and that 
this could provide insight for heterosexual couples); Solnit, supra note 31; see also Tara 
Parker-Pope, Gay Marriage: Same, but Different, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/10/health/10well.html [https://perma.cc/RY3J-PNWG] (“Gay 
relationships tend to be more egalitarian, in part because same-sex couples don’t divide work 
along traditional gender lines.”).
45 E.g., Amanda Chatel, Same-Sex Couples Communicate Better and Share Chore 
Duties Better, New Survey Says, Plus More Things Straight Couples Can Learn from Gay 
Couples, BUSTLE (June 5, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/articles/88248-same-sex-couples-
communicate-better-and-share-chore-duties-better-new-survey-says-plus-more-things-
straight [https://perma.cc/XG6K-V7MV] (encouraging different-sex couples to adopt traits 
found in same-sex couples to stabilize their relationships); Liza Mundy, The Gay Guide to 
Wedded Bliss, ATLANTIC (June 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/06/
the-gay-guide-to-wedded-bliss/309317/ [https://perma.cc/EH23-EM5X] (“Gay marriage can 
function as a controlled experiment, helping us see which aspects of marital difficulty are 
truly rooted in gender and which are not.”); Emily Esfahani Smith, Are Gay Marriages 
Healthier than Straight Marriages?, POLITICO MAG. (June 26, 2015), http://www.politico.com
/magazine/story/2015/06/gay-marriages-better-than-straight-marriages-119465 [https://perma.cc/
4YJG-VM9A] (citing a study that found that gay couples argue better than straight couples 
because they are of the same gender). 
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B. Reality
The reality of same-sex households is more complicated. Several studies 
indeed conclude that same-sex couples divide labor in more egalitarian ways.46
They indicate, for instance, that same-sex couples are statistically more 
egalitarian coparents than different-sex couples,47 that they value equality in 
nonlabor market activities,48 and that they are more likely to have dual-income 
households.49
                                                                                                                     
46 E.g., Kurdek, supra note 14, at 146–47; Mally Shechory & Riva Ziv, Relationships 
Between Gender Role Attitudes, Role Division, and Perception of Equity Among 
Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian Couples, 56 SEX ROLES 629, 632–37 (2007) (finding that 
same-sex couples divide up household labor more equitably than different-sex couples);
Solomon et al., supra note 14, at 565–74. 
47 See, e.g., KENNETH MATOS, FAMILIES & WORK INST., MODERN FAMILIES: SAME- AND
DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES NEGOTIATION AT HOME 7–19 (2015) (a survey conducted by the 
Families and Work Institute that found that same-sex couples are more likely than different-
sex couples to share labor related to childcare and revealed that 74% of the same-sex couples 
share routine childcare responsibilities, while only 38% of different-sex couples do, and 62% 
of same-sex couples share responsibilities for a sick child, compared to 32% of different-sex 
couples); Abbie E. Goldberg et al., The Division of Labor in Lesbian, Gay, and Heterosexual 
New Adoptive Parents, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 812, 813 (2012) (in female couples who use 
donor insemination the partner who carries the child tends to perform more of the childcare 
responsibilities, but when adopting a non-biologically related child, same-sex couples tend 
to divide up childcare based on the preferences and strengths of the individual); Samantha 
L. Tornello et al., Division of Labor Among Gay Fathers: Associations with Parent, Couple 
and Child Adjustment, 2 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER DIVERSITY 365, 365–
66 (2015) (finding that “[g]ay fathers reported having and desiring egalitarian divisions of 
[unpaid] labor. . . . [D]iscrepancies between actual and ideal division of [household and 
childcare] labor were associated with” fathers’ satisfaction with life and couples’ relationship 
functioning).
48 Shechory & Ziv, supra note 46, at 635–36. See generally Lisa K. Jepsen & 
Christopher A. Jepsen, An Empirical Analysis of the Matching Patterns of Same-Sex and 
Opposite-Sex Couples, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 435, 435–36 (2002) (“[E]vidence of positive 
assortative mating for all traits and across all types of couples. The positive assortative 
mating, however, is stronger for non-labor-market traits (e.g., age and education) than for 
labor-market traits (e.g. hourly earnings).”); BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 13. 
49 Dan A. Black et al., The Economics of Lesbian and Gay Families, 21 J. ECON. PERSP.
53, 62 (2007) (data pulled from 2000 census). In addition, despite a widespread myth that 
same-sex couples enjoy more income than different-sex couples, same-sex couples 
experience more vulnerability to poverty than different-sex couples. M.V. LEE BADGETT ET 
AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., NEW PATTERNS OF POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL 
COMMUNITY 9 (June 2013). In fact, the stability of same-sex relationships increases as 
economic equality increases, and they are also more likely to form long-term relationships 
with economic equals. Katherine Weisshaar, Earnings Equality and Relationship Stability 
for Same-Sex and Heterosexual Couples, 93 SOC. FORCES 93, 107 (2014) (“Equality of 
earnings reduces the likelihood of breakup for same-sex couples, while it increases the 
likelihood of breakup for heterosexual couples.”).
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Since the 1990s, however, researchers have scrutinized the validity of the 
myth of egalitarianism.50 In a sociological study of fifty-two same-sex 
households, sociologist Christopher Carrington observed that while “lesbigay”
families seem committed to viewing all “lesbigay” families as egalitarian,51
“they, like all other families, struggle with real world concerns about how to 
balance work and family obligations, […] the dynamics that produce inequality 
in heterosexual families also produce inequality within lesbigay families.”52 The 
invisibility of much domestic labor, according to Carrington, causes confusion 
and resentment,53 and only “[a] minority of lesbigay families do achieve a rough 
equivalence in the distribution of domestic work.”54 Carrington concludes that 
“[t]rue equality . . . eludes many of these families,” and this is mostly due to 
material economic circumstances.55 More recent studies have also found no real 
differences in egalitarianism between same-sex and different-sex couples.56
                                                                                                                     
50 CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 176–77; see also Widiss, supra note 4, at 14 (arguing 
that egalitarianism in same-sex couples comes from the inability to marry, and that 
specialization in same-sex couples will increase with marriage equality).
51 CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 177 (“Typical responses included: ‘Oh I would say 
it’s fifty-fifty around here,’ or ‘we pretty much share all of the responsibilities,’ . . . .”). 
Carrington observed that “[m]any lesbigay family members fail to make much of a 
distinction between what they consider equal and what they consider fair,” and that “[t]he 
blurring of these quite distinct matters is necessary to maintaining the myth of 
egalitarianism.” Id. He speculated that “lesbigay families portray themselves using the ideals 
put forward by American culture, ideals propagating the myth of the egalitarian middle-class 
family.” Id. at 178. 
52 CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 178. 
53 Id. at 180 (“Monitoring the house for cleanliness, monitoring the calendar for 
birthdays, monitoring the catalog for appropriate gifts, monitoring the cupboard for low 
supplies, monitoring the mood of one’s spouse, and monitoring the family finances all are 
expressions of domesticity, and all are mostly invisible.”).
54 Id. at 184 (“Roughly 25 percent (thirteen) of the families I studied approach this 
rough parity. The participants in these families appear to take responsibility for, as well as 
spend similar amounts of time on domestic matters.”). Wealthier couples can purchase 
domesticity “in the marketplace” and outsource it, thus enhancing egalitarianism in the 
relationship. Id. at 185 (“A very clear picture emerges here. Some lesbigay families achieve 
partial equity in their relationships through reliance on the labors of mostly working-poor 
people.”). Carrington also noticed an egalitarian pattern in families “where both individuals, 
regardless of gender, work in traditionally female-identified professional occupations . . . .”
Id.
55 Id. at 206 (“If the reality is that only one member of the family can make money in a 
fulfilling way, then lesbigay families adjust to that reality.”).
56 See, e.g., ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN
99–101 (2010); Lawrence A. Kurdek, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really
Different from Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 880, 890–93 (2004) 
(concluding that overall patterns do not indicate substantive differences between same-sex 
couples and different-sex couples in a way that increases risk for distress for either group or 
in ways that will increase partnership instability); Mignon R. Moore, Gendered Power 
Relations Among Women: A Study of Household Decision Making in Black, Lesbian 
Stepfamilies, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 335, 352 (2008) (finding that “[d]espite being in a same-sex 
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Several studies found that income disparity and gender stereotyping lead higher 
earners in same-sex couples to traditionally masculine chores, and lower earners 
to traditionally feminine chores.57 A recent study reveals that lower earners in 
same-sex couples tend to cook while higher earners tend to make financial 
decisions.58 In addition, in a recent population poll,59 when asked about division 
of labor in same-sex households, subjects (from the general public) assigned 
“traditionally female chores . . . to the more feminine partner, and traditionally 
male tasks were typically assigned to the more masculine partner.”60 Similar 
results were reported regarding childcare.61 In sum, reality has not cooperated 
                                                                                                                     
union, gender continues to profoundly influence the construction of family life”); Letitia 
Anne Peplau & Adam W. Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 58 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 405, 409, 415 (2007) (finding that traditional extrafamilial gendered 
roles influence the distribution of labor and assignment of tasks within the family).
57 E.g., Goldberg et al., supra note 47, at 813 (“both lesbian and gay male nonparent 
couples share housework more equally than heterosexual couples, although ethnographic 
research . . . provided evidence that same-sex couples may be invested in portraying the 
division of housework as more egalitarian than it actually is.” (citations omitted)); Peplau & 
Fingerhut, supra note 56, at 409 (dominance in same-sex couples is likely linked to income 
status); Weisshaar, supra note 49, at 96. 
58 MATOS, supra note 47, at 20 (“[S]ame-sex couples did not have an overabundance 
of shared responsibilities that would suggest that equal divisions are a consistent norm for 
them.”); see also Maree Burns et al., Financial Affairs? Money Management in Same-Sex 
Relationships, 37 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 481, 481 (2008) (examining how twenty-two 
cohabiting same-sex couples manage and think about their finances and concluding that 
while there is an underlying norm of equality, that attempt resulted in higher earner 
maintaining status and control; nevertheless, lesbian and gay couples favored “co-
independence” rather than merging finances).
59 Press Release, Elizabeth McCauley, Am. Sociological Ass’n, Americans Think Sex 
Should Determine Chores for Straight Couples, Masculinity and Femininity for Same-Sex 
Couples (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.asanet.org/press-center/press-releases/americans-
think-sex-should-determine-chores-straight-couples-masculinity-and-femininity-same-sex
[https://perma.cc/Y6R3-393T]. But see Arwa Mahdawi, ‘Who’s the Man?’ Why the Gender 
Divide in Same-Sex Relationships Is a Farce, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/aug/23/same-sex-relationship-gender-roles-chores 
[https://perma.cc/Q8LP-4GLV] (arguing that the American Sociological Association’s study 
presented unrealistic questions that perpetuated conventional stereotypes and did not yield 
legitimate results).
60 McCauley, supra note 59 (“According to the researchers, 66 percent of respondents 
believed the more feminine partner should be responsible for buying groceries, 61 percent 
felt that partner should cook, and 58 percent thought that partner should clean the house and 
do the laundry. On the other hand, 67 percent of respondents believed that the more 
masculine partner should handle automobile maintenance and outdoor chores.”).
61 Females in different-sex relationships “were also expected to handle the majority of 
childcare tasks.” Id. (“Eighty-two percent of respondents said the female partner should be 
responsible for the children’s physical needs, 72 percent thought she should take care of the 
children’s emotional needs, and 62 percent believed the woman should be the stay-at-home 
parent. Male partners were assigned only one childcare task by a majority of respondents: 
55 percent felt the man should be in charge of discipline. . . . The findings for whether the 
more masculine or feminine partner should be the stay-at-home parent and be in charge of 
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with myth. There is much striving for egalitarianism in same-sex couples, and 
some data to support success, but real equality is rarely achieved. 
IV. THE MYTH’S EFFECT ON BARGAINING FOR SAME-SEX DIVORCE
In 1979, in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, Robert Mnookin and 
Lewis Kornhauser articulated the eminent argument for private ordering in 
divorce.62 “[T]he primary function of contemporary divorce law,” they argued, 
“[is] not . . . imposing order from above, but rather . . . providing a framework 
within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution
rights and responsibilities.”63 Private ordering in divorce is, and should be, 
encouraged by courts,64 they argued. When individuals can resolve the terms of 
divorce outside the courtroom, the costs of litigation are minimized, painful 
adversarial proceedings and uncertainties are avoided,65 kids benefit,66 time is 
saved, and agreements are more likely to reflect the preferences of those 
involved.67 Although courts ultimately decide custody and visitation of 
children,68 “parents actually have broad powers to make their own deals [and 
these are largely] rubber stamped even in cases involving children.”69 It is best 
for children, they argue, that parents are “given considerable freedom to decide 
custody matters—subject only to the same minimum standards for protecting 
the child from neglect and abuse.”70
                                                                                                                     
discipline were not statistically significant for same-sex couples.”). In same-sex couples, “62
percent of respondents expected the more feminine partner to attend to the physical needs of 
the children, and 60 percent believed the more feminine spouse should handle the emotional 
needs of the children, the researchers said.” Id. The researchers concluded that “[biological
sex] was by far the strongest determinant of which tasks people assigned to each spouse in 
heterosexual couples.” Id. 
62 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 950.
63 Id. at 950.
64 Id. at 951.
65 Id. at 974.
66 Id. at 958.
67 Id. at 974.
68 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 954–55 (“In families with minor children, 
existing law imposes substantial doctrinal constraints. For those allocational decisions that 
directly affect children—that is, child support, custody, and visitation—parents lack the 
formal power to make their own law. Judges, exercising the state’s parens patriae power, 
are said to have responsibility to determine who should have custody and on what 
conditions.”).
69 Id. at 955. 
70 Id. at 957. First, “[a] child’s future relationship with each of his parents is better 
ensured and his existing relationship less damaged by a negotiated settlement than by one 
imposed by a court after an adversary proceeding.” Id. at 958. “Second, the parents will know 
more about the child than will the judge, since they have better access to information about 
the child’s circumstances and desires.” Id. Parents, like judges, may make mistakes, but “the 
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This Part examines Mnookin and Kornhauser’s theory and demonstrates 
how the myth of egalitarianism skews current bargaining conditions in 
contemporary same-sex divorces. 
A. “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law”
There are four legal consequences to divorce: (1) distribution of marital 
property; (2) spousal support; (3) child support; and (4) child custody and 
visitation.71 The authors observe that marital property, spousal support, and 
child support “are all basically problems of money, and the distinctions among 
them become very blurred. Each can be translated into present dollar values.”72
Furthermore, “money and custody issues are inextricably linked”73 such that “to 
a considerable degree, it is possible to reduce the concerns of divorce bargaining 
into two elements: money and custody.”74 This means that “over some range of 
alternatives, each parent may be willing to exchange custodial rights and 
obligations for income or wealth.”75 Under this realist view, “most parents 
would prefer to see the child a bit less and be able to give the child better 
housing, more food, more education, better health care, and some luxuries.”76
Here is the crux: divorcing parties typically exchange parenting time for money 
and vice versa. 
                                                                                                                     
possibility that negotiated agreements may not be optimal for the child hardly can be a 
sufficient argument against a preference for private ordering.” Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 959; see also id. at 960 (“From the economic perspective of bargaining spouses, 
alimony and child support seem fungible: both involve periodic money payments and, 
indeed, will often be paid by a single check from the noncustodial parent. . . . Consequently, 
child-support payments that are used for housing and feeding the child will inevitably inure 
to the benefit of the custodial spouse.”).
73 Id. at 960.
74 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 963.
75 Id. at 964. Additionally, “parents may tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as 
a means of enforcing their rights without resort to court.” Id.
76 Id.
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This “money for custody” formula, as some have noticed, often presumes a 
gendered division of labor between mothers and fathers.77 The idea that a 
mother will trade custodial rights for money presumes that she has custodial 
rights to trade. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law assumes a binary family 
structure consisting of (1) a primary caregiver, and (2) a higher income wage
provider. Each party allegedly has an incentive to give custody or money in 
order to get custody or money.78 The nature of this exchange, according to the 
authors, is nurtured by “important cultural values.”79 Parenting, in their view, is 
embedded in support obligations for fathers and custody rights for mothers.80 A
breadwinner should hold his end of the deal if he is to enjoy parenting privileges, 
and “a mother who purposely prevents a father from maintaining his relationship 
with his children . . . may be viewed as no longer entitled to his support.”81
                                                                                                                     
77 See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism, and the 
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 19 (1986) (arguing that the Mnookin 
and Kornhauser framework assumes women value custody of their children more than men); 
Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian 
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 546–47 (1998) (“Women, notoriously, also do less well by 
divorce. . . . Their preference for the custody of children imposes additional financial 
burdens. Men, in contrast, customarily make a greater investment in labor market capital, 
which is portable in the event of divorce.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Deborah 
Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 
VA. L. REV. 79, 143 (2016) (feminists have extended Mnookin and Kornhauser’s critique by 
arguing that a sex-neutral custody standard heavily favors fathers because judges reward 
men’s greater earning power, while viewing mothers with greater earning power as
potentially shirking their parental responsibilities). Mnookin and Kornhauser, to some 
degree, acknowledge that husbands will generally have the financial bargaining chip. 
Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 993 (“There may well be cases in which one 
spouse (stereotypically the husband) is highly sophisticated in business matters, while the 
other spouse is an innocent lamb being led to the slaughter.”). Barbara Stark lends support 
for this proposition, stating that marital gender roles will present themselves in divorce 
proceedings. Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin 
Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 1517 (1991) (“Gendered dynamics of domination 
and submission are almost inevitable at divorce, when the context reinforces gendered 
identities such as ‘wife/husband’ and ‘mother/father.’”).
78 This presumption of traditional division of labor is also reflected in the author’s
argument that the trade-off between money and custody may help keep the parties away from 
courts at the later postdivorce stages. Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 964–65
(“[I]t is often time-consuming and expensive to enforce promises in court. . . . If a father who 
values visitation fails to make support payments, then, quite apart from the mother’s ability
to enforce his promise in court . . . the mother may believe that she can retaliate by 
informally cutting off the father’s visitation or making it more difficult. . . . Similarly, a 
father may believe that his ability to cut off support will ensure that the mother will keep her 
word concerning visitation.”).
79 Id. at 966.
80 Id. (“A father who fails to support his children, at least when he has the financial 
capacity to do so, may in popular perception no longer be entitled to maintain a relationship 
with his minor children if the custodial mother objects.”).
81 Id.
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With this traditional family structure in mind, the authors offer five factors 
that will typically influence the bargaining for divorce: 
(1) the preferences of the divorcing parents; (2) the bargaining endowments 
created by legal rules that indicate the particular allocation a court will 
impose if the parties fail to reach agreement; (3) the degree of uncertainty 
concerning the legal outcome if the parties go to court, which is linked to the 
parties’ attitudes towards risk; (4) transaction costs and the parties’ respective 
abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic behavior.82
Most of these factors are self-explanatory. Regarding the second factor, the 
authors explain that “[d]ivorcing parents do not bargain over the division of 
family wealth and custodial prerogatives in a vacuum . . . . The legal 
rules . . . give each parent certain claims based on what each would get if the 
case went to trial.”83 This means that “the outcome that the law will impose if 
no agreement is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips—an 
endowment of sorts.”84 That is the essence of bargaining in the shadow of the 
law. 
The bargaining chips as envisioned by the authors, as we have seen, are not 
gender neutral: they reflect a traditional division of labor in which the legal rules 
assign mothers the primary parent position and fathers the primary breadwinner 
position.85 Fathers will therefore bargain for more parenting time, while mothers 
may trade parenting in exchange for money.86 Both will benefit from private 
ordering. Given the still-existing gendered division of labor in many U.S. 
households,87 these insights are not necessarily dated. They capture how divorce 
                                                                                                                     
82 Id.
83 Id. at 968.
84 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 968–69 (“Assume that in disputed 
custody cases the law flatly provided that all mothers had the right to custody of minor 
children and that all fathers only had the right to visitation two weekends a 
month. . . . Assume further that the legal rules relating to [money] gave the mother some 
determinate share of the family’s economic resources.”). 
85 Id. at 968–69 (“The range of negotiated outcomes would be limited to those that leave 
both parents as well off as they would be in the absence of a bargain.”). 
86 Id. at 969.
87 This gendered division of labor for different-sex marriages has changed since 1979, 
when Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law was published. However, recent studies reveal 
that different-sex couples with a more egalitarian division of labor revert into traditional 
gender roles when transitioning to parenthood. Sabra L. Katz-Wise et al., Gender-Role 
Attitudes and Behavior Across the Transition to Parenthood, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCYHOL. 18, 27 (2010) (“Overall, parents become more traditional in their attitudes and 
behavior from pregnancy through the first year postpartum.”); Jill E. Yavorsky et al., The 
Production of Inequality: The Gender Division of Labor Across the Transition to 
Parenthood, 77 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 662, 674 (2015) (“Prebirth, the women in our sample 
were not disadvantaged in terms of work and had achieved largely equitable 
workloads. . . . [T]he birth of the child dramatically changed the division of labor in our 
sample. . . . [W]omen shouldered the majority of physical and engagement child care, and 
the gender housework gap emerged such that women performed more housework than men; 
men actually significantly declined in housework by 5 hours across the transition to 
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actually works in many marriages that follow scripted gender norms.88 Same-
sex divorces, as we will see, complicate this formula.
B. Ineffective Bargaining for Same-Sex Divorce
The main claim of this Article is that a myth of egalitarianism in same-sex 
relationships obstructs effective bargaining for same-sex divorces in three ways.
First, it is extrinsically linked to what this Article calls “divorce 
exceptionalism.” Second, it skews the bargaining chips of “children for money”
described above. Third, the combination of the first two elements encourages
strategic and aggressive behavior in same-sex divorces. I will address each of 
these in turn. 
1. Divorce Exceptionalism
No state has enacted separate marital dissolution rules for same-sex couples. 
Nor will any state do so.89 The same rules apply to all divorcing individuals in 
the United States.90 Yet evidence from the first wave of same-sex divorces 
suggests that it not uncommon for one party—usually the higher income 
spouse—to claim that general marital dissolution rules do not apply in same-sex 
                                                                                                                     
parenthood.”); see also Alexandra Killewald, Money, Work, and Marital Stability: Assessing 
Change in the Gendered Determinants of Divorce, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 696, 717 (2016) (“The 
determinants of marital stability for modern marriages are thus [not] post-
gender. . . . [M]arriage remains a gendered institution, embedded in the larger gender 
structure, with the division of labor, not financial resources, the primary lens through which 
this gendered nature is reflected.” (citation omitted)); Jaime L. Marks et al., Family Patterns 
of Gender Role Attitudes, 61 SEX ROLES 221, 224 (2009) (“[W]hen couples disagree with 
respect to gender role attitudes (i.e., housework division), both wives and husbands report 
higher levels of marital tension and conflict.”); Brigid Schulte, Once the Baby Comes, Moms 
Do More, Dads Do Less Around the House, WASH. POST (May 7, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2015/05/07/once-the-baby-comes-moms-
do-more-dads-do-less-around-the-house/?utm_term=.41873045e99c [https://perma.cc/E2M4-
UVHM] (“And before we knew it, instead of being the egalitarian couple for the new 
millennium, as we intended to be, we had unintentionally slid into pretty traditional gender 
roles. Except that I still worked full-time.”).
88 See Yavorsky et al., supra note 87, at 675; see also Katz-Wise et al., supra note 87,
at 18.
89 Sex- or sexuality-based classification of this sort would be unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
90 See also Feigenbaum, supra note 8, at 263 (“If the [Supreme] Court [legalizes same-
sex marriage], then a divorcing same-sex couple would be able to ‘Bargain in the Shadow of 
the Law’ exactly as Mnookin and Kornhauser described thirty-five years ago.”). 
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divorces.91 This is divorce exceptionalism.92 The basic claim of the divorce 
exceptionalist—“general marriage dissolution rules do not apply to me”—is 
clearly incorrect as a matter of law.93 It nonetheless warrants attention because 
the ex-spouse may need litigation to enforce the law. If the divorce 
exceptionalist’s ex-spouse is passive, heartbroken, or lacking financial means, 
they may concede to the absence of law. Divorce exceptionalism, although 
legally flawed, could be outcome determinative—much like “fake news.”94
The myth of egalitarianism is dangerous because it enables and supports 
divorce exceptionalism. The divorce exceptionalist may rely on the myth to 
argue that general divorce rules are meant only for different-sex couples.95
Worse, the ex-spouse of the divorce exceptionalist may also internalize the myth
or its derivative myth of individual autonomy in same-sex relationships. Since 
the 1960s, feminists have rejected an ideology of “separate spheres”96 as sexist, 
                                                                                                                     
91 KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 207–13
(2015) (providing an example where one partner in a same-sex dissolution does not feel 
aspects of divorce rules should apply to her relationship); Hertz et al., supra note 1, at 127–
28 (observing that the long history of legal-sponsored oppression has led some to feel 
distrustful of the legal system and “underlying distrust can cause parties in same-sex dispute 
to overreact and feel wronged by the dissolution process, with no direct parallel in 
heterosexual dissolution where the parties typically have greater trust in the legitimacy of 
the legal system”); Mellissa Holtzman, GLBT Parents’ Rights During Custody Decision 
Making: The Influence of Doctrine, Statute, and Societal Factors in the United States, 9 J.
GLBT FAM. STUDIES 364, 379–81 (2013) (providing examples of where biological parents 
of children in same-sex marriages used nonrecognition of marriage to defeat the marital 
presumption that favors the non-birth parent’s custodial claim to a child); see also Green, 
supra note 1 (“‘Gay folks are not prepared to deal with what comes with marriage’ . . . . ‘Not 
a clue what they’re getting into. When I tell people I’m getting divorced, most say, ‘I had no 
idea you even had to do that! Oh my god!’’”).
92 See Michael Ignatieff, Introduction to AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 3 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). For further analysis of legal exceptionalism, see Ben-
Asher, supra note 25 and Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71 OHIO ST.
L.J. 699, 701 (2010). 
93 See FRANKE, supra note 91, at 211 (standard rules of equitable distribution apply 
despite a couple’s oral premarital financial agreement because such agreements must be in 
writing under New Jersey law).
94 For recent discussion of the significance of fake news, see All in with Chris Hayes: 
Fake News Breaks Through (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.msnbc.
com/all-in/watch/fake-news-breaks-through-826526275708 [https://perma.cc/6VD5-ZYDB]
(discussing poll that indicates that many believe fake news); Morning Joe: The Real-Life 
Implications of Fake News (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.msnbc.
com/morning-joe/watch/the-real-life-implications-of-fake-news-825925699506 [https://perma.cc/
2AX7-PJQG] (discussing real consequences of fake news). 
95 See FRANKE, supra note 91, at 213–14; Hertz et al., supra note 1, at 128–29; Green, 
supra note 1; Compton, supra note 27 (describing the dissolution of a same-sex female 
couple where the biological mother relied on the lack of the marital presumption in an 
attempt to deny the parental rights of her ex-partner). 
96 Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1198 
(2016). 
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patriarchal, subordinating, and exploitative to women.97 An ethos of female 
autonomy now predominates feminist literature98 and popular culture.99 In a 
female same-sex couple, this ethos can lead the ex-spouse of the divorce 
exceptionalist to dissonance. She had viewed her marriage as egalitarian and 
herself as autonomous, but now finds herself in a reality of financial dependence 
often exacerbated by children to support. In male same-sex couples as well, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the lower income spouse often finds it 
effeminizing to request money in marital dissolution.100 Admitting financial 
dependency on an ex-spouse may feel like a painful moral failure.101
Under the myth of egalitarianism, one or both parties, in denial of their 
material reality, may view themselves as financial equals and as autonomous.102
This may lead to divorce exceptionalism,103 which is today a major obstacle to 
effective divorce negotiations. It is impossible to bargain in the shadow of the 
law when the law is absent. Without legal rules as bargaining chips, ex-spouses 
may replicate the bargaining strategies of their failed marriages and possibly 
even those of their parents’ divorces.104
                                                                                                                     
97 See id. at 1198–1209 (demonstrating how the traditional division of labor was 
confronted by legal feminists and courts since the 1970s).
98 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982). 
99 See, e.g., Sex and the City (HBO 1998–2004); The L Word (Showtime Networks 
2004–2009).
100 See FRANKE, supra note 91, at 213 (“Where the two men in the couple have different 
earning power or assets, the less affluent spouse is declining to demand his half share at the 
time of divorce because it genders him as a wife to do so. He would rather leave the marriage 
with his masculinity intact than be turned into an ex-wife receiving alimony.”). 
101 Id. at 212–13 (“Ruth looks a lot like a ‘lesbian wife’—going in and out of the wage-
labor market, earning less money, and contributing less financially to the family’s joint 
support. The judge even understood her to be a ‘housewife’ for part of their marriage, 
performing unpaid domestic labor as is customary for wives/mothers.”). 
102 See id. at 212 (describing the attitude of a higher wage earner in a female same-sex 
couple, “the lesbian husband position”: “She feels she earned her own money fair and square, 
not due to any gender-based advantage that a male husband married to a female wife might 
have. Ruth should not have any legal entitlement to her money”); see also Hertz et al., supra 
note 1, at 135 (“A couple may be largely unaware of any difficulties associated with these 
imbalances during their relationship, though they may come into play surprisingly and 
upsettingly when the relationship fails and financials disputes arise.”).
103 Notably, divorce exceptionalism could sometimes lead to just results. Katherine 
Franke gives an example of a situations in which it is unfair for one man to claim access to 
the wealth of the other. See FRANKE, supra note 91, at 216–17 (“If Rob freely chose to live 
for eight years with [the] understanding of what Steve owed him before they got married, 
why can’t he freely choose to waive any rights to support after they marry?”).
104 Paul R. Amato & Danielle D. DeBoer, The Transmission of Marital Instability
Across Generations: Relationship Skills or Commitment to Marriage?, 63 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1038, 1038 (2001) (finding that married persons whose parents were divorced were 
much more likely to have thought about divorce than persons whose parents were 
continuously married because they were more likely to think that marital problems could not 
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2. Legal Rules as Bargaining Chips
As mentioned above, five parameters will affect divorce settlements: “(1) 
the preferences of the divorcing parents; (2) the bargaining endowments created 
by legal rules . . . ; (3) the degree of uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if 
the parties go to court . . . ; (4) transaction costs and the parties’ respective 
abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic behavior.”105 Of these factors, the most 
significant is that legal norms always hover in the background of divorce 
negotiations.106 The myth of egalitarianism complicates the “children for 
money” exchange elaborated in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law in two 
ways: (1) misaligned bargaining chips; and (2) legal uncertainty.
a. Obstacle #1: Misaligned Bargaining Chips
In same-sex divorces, the “money for kids” formula offered in Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Law will often play out differently. One effect of the myth 
on same-sex divorces is that bargaining chips for money and children are often 
misaligned. As we have seen, the main claim in Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law is that money and custody are linked in that “each parent may be willing 
to exchange custodial rights and obligations for income or wealth,”107 namely 
“most parents would prefer to see the child a bit less and be able to give the child 
better housing, more food, more education, better health care, and some 
luxuries.”108 Bargaining is effective when parents want to exchange parenting 
time for money and vice versa without judicial interference. As discussed above, 
for Mnookin and Kornhauser, money and custody are linked in a gendered 
way.109 One parent will trade custodial rights for income and the other will do 
                                                                                                                     
be fixed and were more pessimistic about the chances of improving their relationships); Ming 
Cui et al., The Effect of Parental Divorce on Young Adults’ Romantic Relationship 
Dissolution: What Makes a Difference?, 18 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 410, 420–21 (2011) 
(concluding that children of divorced parents held a more favorable attitude toward divorce, 
which was associated with lower commitment to their romantic relationship and that young 
adults’ perception of parental divorce varied depending on interparental conflict and parents’
marital quality before the divorce).
105 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 966; see also id. at 968 (“Divorcing 
parents . . . bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal rules governing alimony, child 
support, marital property, and custody give each parent certain claims based on what each 
would get if the case went to trial. . . . [T]he outcome that the law will impose if no agreement 
is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips—an endowment of sorts.” (emphasis 
added)).
106 Id. at 985–86.
107 Id. at 964; see also id. (“[P]arents may tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as 
a means of enforcing their rights without resort to court.”).
108 Id.
109 See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 77, at 19 (“[W]omen take more responsibility for 
their children than do men, love their children more than men do, and are more willing than 
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the opposite. They posit a family organized around a primary caregiver 
(typically female) and a higher wage provider (typically male), in which each 
has an incentive to “give” what they have (wealth or custody) in order to get 
what they do not (custody or wealth).110 The myth of egalitarianism and the 
realities of many same-sex households, as Part II shows, do not fit this formula.
The first parameter that will affect the bargaining for divorce is parenting 
time preferences.111 As the authors observe, “[i]nformed bargaining requires a 
parent to assess accurately his or her own preferences concerning custodial 
alternatives.”112 How parents divided parenting during the marriage does not 
necessarily reflect the desires of one or both parties upon dissolution.113 In 
addition, spite or altruism could affect the bargaining process.114 An altruistic 
parent may commit to a “lesser” agreement than she or he would get in court if 
they think it would benefit the child or former spouse.115 A spiteful parent may 
do the opposite.116 In this first stage, each party assesses how much parenting 
time they desire postdissolution.117
                                                                                                                     
men to sacrifice in order to retain custody of their children.”); Dinner, supra note 77, at 143–
44; see also Wax, supra note 77, at 89.
110 This presumption of traditional division of labor is also reflected in the author’s
argument that the trade-off between money and custody may help keep the parties away from 
courts at the later postdivorce stages. Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 964–65
(“[I]t is often time-consuming and expensive to enforce promises in court. . . . If a father who 
values visitation fails to make support payments, then, quite apart from the mother’s ability 
to enforce his promise in court . . . the mother may believe that she can retaliate by 
informally cutting off the father’s visitation or making it more difficult. . . . Similarly, a 
father may believe that his ability to cut off support will ensure that the mother will keep her 
word concerning visitation.”).
111 There are many possible variations to a parenting agreement—ranging from one 
parent getting primary physical and legal custody and the other only visitation rights—to 
joint physical and legal custody. See id. at 963. 
112 Id. at 967.
113 Id. (“The information each parent has relates to the actual division of child-rearing 
tasks in an ongoing family. Dissolution or divorce inevitably alters this division, and the 
parent may discover new advantages or disadvantages to child-rearing responsibilities. 
Moreover, the parents’ own needs may alter drastically after divorce.” (citation omitted)).
114 Id. at 968. 
115 Id. (“For example, a father may commit himself to child-support payments beyond 
what he predicts a court would require, simply because he does not want his children to suffer 
economic detriment from a divorce. A mother may agree to substantial visitation for the 
father because she thinks this is good for the children, even though she personally despises 
the father and wants nothing more to do with him. Similarly, either or both spouses may have 
preferences that attach great weight to the happiness and desires of their former spouse.”).
116 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 968.
117 Notably, the information each party conveys to the other side on this point may or 
may not be accurate, depending on levels of trust and the bargaining style of the parties and 
their attorneys. See id. at 972.
1366 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
Parenting-time preferences could differ significantly in divorcing same-sex 
and different-sex couples.118 Existing data discussed in Part II indicates that 
during the course of the relationship, same-sex couples tend to prefer and aspire 
to equal parenting arrangements.119 Even when de facto parenting time was not 
equal during a same-sex marriage, neither party is likely to view itself as a 
“secondary” parent.120 This data and the myth of egalitarianism, which is often 
internalized by the divorcing spouses, leads individuals in same-sex divorces to 
seek at least equal-time parenting arrangements.121 By contrast, although the 
maternal presumption has been abolished,122 and fathers’ rights awareness has 
grown,123 equal parenting is not yet the leading norm in most different-sex 
                                                                                                                     
118 It is obviously risky to generalize regarding such personal circumstances that may 
vary across class, ethnicity, and race, and we do not have enough data on outcomes of 
bargains for same-sex divorces.
119 See, e.g., MATOS, supra note 47, at 2; GOLDBERG, supra note 56, at 99–101; Tornello 
et al., supra note 47, at 365–66.
120 See generally Hertz et al., supra note 1, at 130–31 (“Although custody disputes can 
arise in all types of dissolutions, disputes over legal parentage are far more common in same-
sex dissolutions.”); id. at 133 (“Even in disputes when both partners are legal parents, the 
issues in same-sex custody disputes are unlike those generally encountered in heterosexual 
custody cases, simply because the psychological dynamics can be so different. . . . It is 
common for the underlying inequality between a biological and a nonbiological parent to 
surface in a custody dispute, with one partner claiming to be the ‘real’ parent and seeking 
preferential custody or decision-making authority or automatic entitlement to a greater 
percentage of the child’s time. Even where the nonbiological parent has been the primary 
caretaker, in a break-up the biological parent is likely to have a particular sense of entitlement 
based on her or his genetic connection to the child.”). 
121 See, e.g., Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Lesbian and Heterosexual Adoptive Mothers’
Experiences of Relationship Dissolution, 73 SEX ROLES 141, 150 (2015) (“Notably, 
participants whose children spent a similar amount of time in both households unanimously 
described the arrangement as working well.”). 
122 Many courts have found that the maternal presumption violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ex Parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695 (Ala. 
1981); Garrett v. Garrett, 464 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); State ex rel. Watts v. 
Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 183 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 
368 A.2d 635, 639 (Pa. 1977) (finding that the Tender Years Doctrine is offensive to the 
concept of equality of the sexes); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119–20 (Utah 1986). All 
states (as well as the District of Columbia) have statutes that require the best interests of the 
child be considered in divorce proceedings. Children’s Bureau, Determining the Best 
Interests of the Child: State Statutes, CHILD WELFARE GATEWAY (Mar. 2016), https://www.
childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/best_interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/R34S-JL7B].
123 Groups such as the Fathers’ Rights Movement and National Parents Organization 
formed to advocate against perceived inequality in family law. About, FATHERS’ RTS.
MOVEMENT, http://fathersrightsmovement.us/about/ [https://perma.cc/75C7-W8EZ]; Our 
Mission, NAT’L PARENTS ORG., https://nationalparentsorganization.org/about-npo/our-
mission [https://perma.cc/ZY6A-F7VH]. These organizations have had some success in 
getting states to act. Ashby Jones, Big Shift Pushed in Custody Disputes, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-shift-pushed-in-custody-disputes-1429204977
[https://perma.cc/ZB2P-KTKD]. But while fathers’ rights awareness has increased, others 
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couples.124 Women typically aspire to, and get more, parenting time in divorce 
settlements.125
In many same-sex divorces, both parties are (or view themselves as) equal 
parents.126 Parenting time is therefore not a strong bargaining chip for either 
party; it may obviously be used as a strategic threat (“I will seek primary custody 
if you do x!”) but it is not a predictable bargaining chip for either side. The 
parenting preferences in same-sex divorces are likely to be closer to joint 
custody.127
With a vague “best interest” standard as the background rule, and with no 
parent having any predictable advantage over the other, the less moneyed spouse 
does not have parenting time as a bargaining chip. The more moneyed spouse, 
by contrast, has comparable bargaining chips to what they would have in a 
different-sex divorce (money). The myth of egalitarianism may therefore be 
utilized to pressure the less moneyed party to exit the marriage “as an equal”
without seeking any sort of support.
                                                                                                                     
have suggested that class is more determinative in custody disputes than gender. Hanna 
Rosin, Dad’s Day in Court, SLATE (May 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/
doublex/2014/05/men_s_rights_recognized_the_pro_father_evolution_of_divorce_and_paternity.
html [https://perma.cc/9BDN-LRN7].
124 TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND 
THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2013, at 1, 4–5, 9 (Jan. 2016) (finding that 17.5% of custodial parents 
were fathers; that custodial mothers were more than likely to have legal or informal child 
support agreements than custodial fathers; that 52.3% of custodial mothers had child support 
agreements while only 31.4% of custodial fathers do; and that of custodial parents due child
support, 88.6% of them were custodial mothers); see also JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY 
LAW 899 (6th ed. 2012) (“A study of 238 randomly selected cases in urban Ohio found that 
approximately 13 percent of sole and joint custody awards went to men. The study found 
that the age of the child still plays a significant role in custody determinations; only 23 
percent of custodial fathers were awarded custody of a child under the age of five.” (citing
Wendy Reiboldt & Sharon Seiling, Factors Related to Men’s Award of Custody, 15 FAM.
ADVOC. 42 (1993))).
125 GRALL, supra note 124, at 4.
126 Nanette Gartrell et al., Family Characteristics, Custody Arrangements, and 
Adolescent Psychological Well-Being After Lesbian Mothers Break Up, 60 FAM. REL. 572, 
581 (2011) (“[N]early three quarters of separated [lesbian] mothers are sharing custody, in 
contrast to a majority of divorced heterosexual American mothers who have sole physical 
and legal custody of their children.”).
127 Id.; Goldberg et al., supra note 121, at 152.
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b. Obstacle #2: A Backdrop of Uncertainty
A further complication in bargaining for any divorce settlement is that it is 
often uncertain how a court will apply a default rule.128 The effect of this 
uncertainty will depend on the attitudes of the parties toward risk—or what 
economists call “risk preferences.”129 For example, because it is often unclear 
how a judge would apply the “best interest” standard,130 individual attitudes 
toward risk will affect the bargaining for divorce. A risk-averse parent may wish 
to avoid having a court decide such an important life issue. For that party, a 
feared mistake of a court is too great to bear, and this will affect their bargaining 
behavior. A risk lover, on the other hand, may be more willing to litigate 
custody. 
This fog of uncertainty applies to all divorcing couples, but is currently 
thicker in same-sex divorces for two reasons. First, in most or all jurisdictions 
there is not enough judicial experience with same-sex divorces. Judges therefore 
have to decide how to interpret and apply rules and standards from different-sex 
divorces. A given judge’s views on homosexuality may tilt outcomes in 
unpredictable ways. Second and relatedly, courts are less likely to rely on 
traditional sex stereotypes when deciding same-sex divorces. Therefore, the 
outcomes are even less predictable than they would be in different-sex divorces. 
Divorcing same-sex couples today are bargaining in the shadow of marital 
dissolution laws that are more uncertain than they are for different-sex couples.
3. Transaction Costs and Strategic Behavior
Financial and emotional transaction costs can influence outcomes of all 
divorce negotiations.131 Financial costs include professional fees, filing fees,
and court costs.132 Emotional costs can also be immense.133 Parties can affect 
the magnitude of the transactional costs such that the party better able to bear 
these costs will have an advantage in divorce bargaining.134 For same-sex 
couples, there is a second emotional dagger. Marriage for most different-sex 
couples has nothing to do with civil rights, self-affirmation, or equal citizenship. 
                                                                                                                     
128 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 969 (“Often, the outcome in court is far 
from certain, with any number of outcomes possible. Indeed, existing legal standards 
governing custody, alimony, child support, and marital property are all striking for their lack 
of precision and thus provide a bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty.”).
129 Id. at 970.
130 Id. at 969–70 (“Except in situations when one parent poses a substantial threat to the 
child’s well-being, predicting who will get custody under this standard is difficult indeed, 
especially given the increasing pressure to reject any presumption in favor of maternal 
custody.” (footnotes omitted)).
131 Id. at 972.
132 Id. at 971–72.
133 Id. at 972.
134 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 972.
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This is not so for members of the LGBT community. Marriage equality was only 
recently litigated, decided, and celebrated as a major civil-rights victory.135
Many of us grew up believing that we will never be able to marry.136 For many,
the civil right to marry has been transformative. Divorce is no civil-rights 
victory. It is often experienced as bitter failure. The emotional injury of failing 
in marriage—a civil right fought so hard for—is unique to LGBT individuals.137
Strategic behavior also deserves special attention here. In all divorces, 
throughout the negotiation process the parties and their attorneys transmit 
information about their own preferences to each other. They typically appeal to 
legal and social norms, but also to threats and bluffs.138 The divorce they 
experienced in childhood may also influence a party’s strategic behavior in 
divorce.139 Children with divorced parents may, consciously or not, repeat 
                                                                                                                     
135 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Supreme Court 
Decision on Marriage Equality (June 26, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/06/26/remarks-president-supreme-court-decision-marriage-equality 
[https://perma.cc/VZ4L-YWFU] (characterizing Obergefell v. Hodges as a “victory for 
America,” and commenting that “we’ve made our union a little more perfect”); Victory for 
Equal Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/the-
same-sex-marriage-rulings.html [https://perma.cc/4UNE-HPZE] (“Today’s two Supreme Court 
rulings involving same-sex marriage were a huge and gratifying victory in the long struggle 
to end government-sanctioned discrimination against gay and lesbian Americans.”); see also 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR 209 (2013). 
136 Notably, there have been strong objections to marriage within the LGBT movement. 
See, e.g., Lisa Duggan, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, 9 STUD. GENDER & SEXUALITY 155,
157 (2008) [hereinafter Duggan, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage] (“[Marriage] has been 
glorified as the best way to exert social control generally and to stem the ‘decline’ in social 
discipline since the 1960s. Why then would lesbian and gay organizations mobilize so 
strenuously for the right to marry?”); Ettelbrick, supra note 40, at 402–03 (arguing that the 
price for same-sex marriage is to sacrifice gay and lesbian identity in favor of simulating 
gendered, heterosexual couples); Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, NATION (Feb. 26, 2004), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/holy-matrimony/ [https://perma.cc/4R9K-HS5K] (arguing that 
the LGBT movement should not use the then-growing movement for equal marriage to 
ignore other issues facing gender inequality and the LGBT movement).
137 Hertz et al., supra note 1, at 125.
138 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 972–3. The authors discuss two models 
of negotiating behavior: a “Strategic Model,” in which the process is “a relatively norm-free 
process centered on the transmutation of underlying bargaining strength into agreement by 
the exercise of power, horse-trading, threat, and bluff;” and a “Norm-Centered Model,”
which involves “elements normally associated with adjudication—the parties and their 
representatives would invoke rules, cite precedents, and engage in reasoned elaboration.” Id.
(quoting Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 637–38 (1976)).
139 See Amato & DeBoer, supra note 104, at 1038 (finding that married persons whose 
parents were divorced were much more likely to have thought about divorce than persons 
whose parents were continuously married, were more likely to think that marital problems 
could not be fixed, and were more pessimistic about the chances of improving their 
relationships); see also Cui et al., supra note 104, at 420–21 (concluding that children of 
divorced parents held a more favorable attitude toward divorce, which was associated with 
1370 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
strategic or aggressive behavior that they were exposed to in childhood.140 The 
negotiation process involves many opportunities for strategic behavior “because 
the parties often will not know with certainty (1) the other side’s true preferences 
with regard to the allocational outcomes; (2) the other spouse’s preferences or 
attitudes towards risk; and (3) what the outcome in court will be, or even what 
the actual odds in court are.”141 In the first wave of same-sex divorces, the myth 
of egalitarianism provides an additional tool with which parties may engage in 
increased and manipulative strategic behavior. 
In sum, the myth of egalitarianism in same-sex relationships can obstruct 
effective bargaining for same-sex divorces in three main ways. First, it enables 
and enhances the disruptive phenomenon of divorce exceptionalism. Second, it 
skews the “money for children” bargaining chips for divorce. Consequently, it 
invites strategic and aggressive behavior by some parties in same-sex divorces. 
IV. A REALIST APPROACH TO SAME-SEX DIVORCE
Parties need clear default rules to bargain effectively for divorce.142 Without 
guiding principles, divorce negotiations may devolve to speculation, intuition, 
threats, and bluffs.143 As Parts II and III demonstrate, a pervasive myth of 
egalitarianism operates today as a disruptive force in many negotiations for 
same-sex divorces. It boosts divorce exceptionalism and blurs the material 
realities of parties to same-sex divorces. This final Part offers two pragmatic 
solutions. First, all legal actors who participate in same-sex divorces, including 
mediators, attorneys, judges, and the parties themselves, must recognize that 
marriage equality comes with divorce equality. That is, there are no special 
marriage laws or divorce laws for gay people. Second, there are very good 
reasons to extend the current shift towards joint-custody presumptions to same-
sex divorces. 
A. Applying Ordinary Dissolution Rules to Same-Sex Divorces
1. Avoiding Mythology
Debunking the myth of egalitarianism is the first step to making bargains 
for same-sex divorce more effective. Myths and mythical figures can sway and 
stir human emotion and instigate legal change. Constitutional historians, 
scholars and jurists have observed that the American Revolution, the Founding 
                                                                                                                     
lower commitment to their romantic relationship and that young adults’ perception of 
parental divorce varied depending on interparental conflict and parents’ marital quality 
before the divorce).
140 Cui et al., supra note 104, at 411–12.
141 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 973.
142 Id. at 996–97.
143 See id. (concluding that guiding principles are in the best interest of both parents and 
children impacted by divorce to mitigate harsh ramifications from divorce negotiations).
2017] MYTH OF EGALITARIANISM IN SAME-SEX DIVORCE 1371
Fathers, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution have all 
generated elaborate myths about American democracy and the rule of law that 
are effective to this day.144 It is no surprise that myths and generalizations about 
gay sexuality and relationships have shaped the civil-rights struggle of lesbians, 
gays, bisexuals, and trans people in the United States.
In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the Supreme Court grounded the right 
to liberty from government intrusion in rhetoric such as “personal bond that is 
more enduring”145 and the “mystery of human life.”146 As the vast literature on 
Lawrence has shown, however, the actual relationship of the plaintiffs, 
Lawrence and Garner, could not be further from these idealized portrayals.147
They hardly knew each other and were probably not even having sex that night 
the police arrested them for allegedly committing sodomy.148 However, the 
Supreme Court and the public needed redeeming myths about homosexuality in 
order to extend Constitutional protections involving sexual freedom in the 
private sphere.149
Relatedly, in extending marriage equality to same-sex couples, in Windsor 
and Obergefell,150 the Supreme Court also endorsed some myths about same-
sex couples while rejecting others. As I have argued elsewhere, the ideas that 
the state can “confer dignity” through marriage licenses, and that same-sex 
                                                                                                                     
144 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2007)
(chronicling the rise of the two-party system, and exploring its effect on the Constitution and 
United States’ rule of law); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION (2005)
(interpreting the Constitution, and exploring its underlying history and theoretical 
principles).
145 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”). 
146 Id. at 574 (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))); see also Katherine M. Franke, 
Comment, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 
1402–04 (2004). 
147 See, e.g., DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
xi–xii (2012) (“When Harris County sheriff’s deputies arrived minutes later, they did not 
find a crazy gunman, but they did report that they caught John Lawrence and Tyron Garner 
in flagrante delicto having anal sex inside Lawrence’s bedroom. . . . The pancaked 
conventional tale remains—years after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas—a stubborn myth.”). 
148 Id. at xii–xiii (“Based on my research, including interviews with most of the 
important participants in the events and their immediate aftermath, I come to a surprising, 
but only probabilistic, conclusion: it is unlikely that sheriff’s deputies actually witnessed 
Lawrence and Garner having sex. . . . John Lawrence himself now flatly denies that Garner 
and he were having sex.”). 
149 Id.
150 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
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couples and their children had been degraded, shamed, and humiliated by the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), do not necessarily reflect the real-life 
experience of many sexual minorities.151 By contrast, courts recognizing same-
sex marriages have had to dismiss negative myths about sexual promiscuity,152
about inability to commit to relationships,153 and about same-sex households 
providing a less promising upbringing to children.154
These myths and generalizations have also come with costs for many 
LGBT.155 Concepts such as dignity, stigma, shame, and egalitarianism can 
energize lawmakers and the broader population.156 They underscore the 
importance of equal citizenship and the depth of injuries. They make good 
headlines for news media.157 But sometimes they are not true. Some gay people 
                                                                                                                     
151 Ben-Asher, supra note 41, at 284 (“The State grants marriage licenses, and it should 
grant them equally to all couples. In so doing, the State does not distribute dignity; it 
acknowledges dignity equally across citizens. . . . [A]dvocates should be careful not to imply 
that human dignity is enhanced by marriage. If dignity inheres in the individual, then neither 
the state where one resides nor the state of matrimony increases that dignity.”); see also 
Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 75–76 (2015) (concluding that contemporary marriage advocates have glorified 
traditional marriage as the ultimate political goal to achieve equality between gays and 
lesbians and straight individuals and, in so doing, have forgotten or even outright ignored 
the individuals in the LGBT community-at-large who will not (or do not) benefit from 
marriage; marriage, in that sense, became a way to measure a gay person’s virtue, that it 
provides an “indicia of bourgeois respectability”).
152 Ben-Asher, supra note 41, at 272 (“Lawrence reasoned that the problem with sodomy 
laws was that they ‘seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.’ . . . Homosexual sex was now recast 
by the Court as intimate private acts. Finally, in Windsor, we find the legal homosexual, this 
time two married women, stripped of their sexuality and sex acts altogether. . . . The 
[Supreme] Court’s decision [in Windsor] centers on the couple’s 2007 marriage ceremony 
and lifelong commitment to each other.”).
153 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“The right to marry thus dignifies couples who ‘wish 
to define themselves by their commitment to each other.’” (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2689)).
154 Id. (“[M]any same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, 
whether biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of children are presently being 
raised by such couples. Most states have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as 
individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents. This 
provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, 
supportive families.” (citation omitted)).
155 See, e.g., FRANKE, supra note 91, at 209–13; Boucai, supra note 151, at 75–76. See 
generally Ben-Asher, supra note 41, at 282 (examining the impact of the Court’s moral 
recognition and validation of a specific type of legal homosexual and the dignity granted 
accordingly).
156 See Adam J. Hirsh, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1361 (2003) 
(“The observation that emotion can move lawmakers is as old as Aristotle, but the notion 
that it affects attention to rules has been sounded on occasion.”).
157 See, e.g., Chatel, supra note 45; James, supra note 44; Parker-Pope, supra note 44; 
Smith, supra note 45; Solnit, supra note 31.
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may have felt shame without marriage equality.158 Others did not.159 Some may 
have felt dignified by the right to marry.160 Others did not.161 Some aspire to 
egalitarian relationships.162 Others do not. 
Today, the myth of egalitarianism in same-sex couples is harming many 
individuals in the first wave of same-sex divorces. As Parts I and II argue, the 
myth obstructs effective bargaining for same-sex divorce by legitimizing 
divorce exceptionalism, skewing the bargaining chips for money and children 
that typically drive the divorce settlement, and consequently inviting strategic 
or aggressive behavior in same-sex divorces. The first step in addressing these 
harms is to increase the awareness of legal actors involved in the divorce 
process, including attorneys, mediators, judges, and the parties themselves, as
they may be biased in their assessment of the dissolving relationship. Bargaining 
for same-sex divorces will become more effective if every relationship is 
assessed on its own merits. Same-sex couples who are aptly characterized as 
egalitarian will end up negotiating under that presumption. The many same-sex 
couples for whom power imbalances exist, will not. All legal actors in same-sex 
divorces must shift the framework from mythical egalitarianism to real-life 
power imbalances.163
2. Rejecting Divorce Exceptionalism
Without the myth on which it stands, the claim that marital dissolution laws 
should not apply to same-sex couples collapses. Modern marriage dissolution 
rules represent the attempts of lawmakers, guided by feminist and liberal law 
reformers, to achieve just distribution of marital assets, rights, and obligations 
when marriages end.164 The standard of “equitable distribution” of marital 
                                                                                                                     
158 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“It would misunderstand these men and women to 
say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so 
deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned 
to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”). 
159 FRANKE, supra note 91, at 214.
160 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“The right to marry thus dignifies couples who ‘wish 
to define themselves by their commitment to each other.’” (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2689)).
161 FRANKE, supra note 91, at 214; see also Duggan, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra 
note 136, at 157.
162 See CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 176–77; supra Part II.B. 
163 See generally Hertz et al., supra note 1, at 142 (legal actors must recognize the 
challenge of mediating same-sex divorces and the underlying social realities involved in 
these relationships); supra Part I. 
164 See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (identifying alimony as a 
concept that originally served as a “means of lifetime support and dependence” from one 
spouse to another but that was replaced with a concept of maintenance that encouraged the 
recipient an opportunity of independence); see also Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 18 (Pa. 
1986) (“Although the Divorce Code was adopted with the intent to ‘effectuate economic 
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property, for example, followed by most states today, stems from the idea that 
the labor of one party to a marriage (in or outside the home) enables the efforts 
of the other.165 Likewise, modern child-support standards are based on a fairness 
principle that both parents have a legal duty to support their children in 
proportion to their wage-earning capacity.166 The exceptionalist claim that 
same-sex couples do not need such rules reflects mythical thinking that power 
imbalances of traditional marriages are absent in same-sex couples.
Since the 1980s, activists and scholars have warned that the marriage-
equality movement may perpetuate assimilationist ideas about gays and 
lesbians.167 They have rightly argued that marriage-equality litigation has 
underplayed the unique aspects of gay culture (such as sexual freedom and 
extended units of mutual care) and instead underscored the likeness of same-sex 
couples to heteronormative marriages.168 This type of critique is now appearing 
in the context of same-sex divorces. Katherine Franke, for example, has claimed 
that “the law of marriage and divorce risk imposing—if not imprinting—status-
based gendered identities on the parties in ways that clearly change how they 
might have seen themselves had marriage law not been on the scene.”169
Because marital dissolution rules presume inequality between men and 
women,170 Franke suggests focusing on “the traditions and norms of gay and 
                                                                                                                     
justice,’ we cannot ignore that alimony was intended to be based on ‘actual need and ability 
to pay.’ . . . [T]he purpose of alimony under our statute is rehabilitation not reimbursement.”
(internal citations omitted)); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-Thinking Alimony: The AAML’s
Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. L. 61, 65–69 (2008) (describing three different eras of alimony: (1) the traditional 
theory of alimony that was prevalent pre-1970s; (2) the beginning of the “Modern Era” in 
the 1970s; and (3) the reforms of the 1990s).
165 See, e.g., Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 752 A.2d 291, 301–02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2000) (“Marital Property means the property, however titled, acquired by one or both parties 
during the marriage.”); Elkus v. Elkus, 169 A.D.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (defining 
New York’s marital property as property “acquired during the marriage ‘regardless of the 
form in which title is held’”). See generally The Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 20 
(2001) (“[A]ll earnings from spousal labor during the marriage are the property of the marital 
‘community’ in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest. Property acquired 
with spousal earnings is therefore also owned equally by the spouses, regardless of whether
purchased with funds earned by the husband, the wife, or both . . . .”).
166 AREEN ET AL., supra note 124, at 1117.
167 FRANKE, supra note 91, at 215; Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already 
Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES 14, 18 (2002). See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 99–109 (2008) (discussing the shortcomings of same-sex 
marriage advocacy as it excludes other family issues that may not directly seem like “gay 
rights” issues); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL (2000) (analyzing the 
theme of politics of sexual shame and the impact of local activism on assimilation). 
168 FRANKE, supra note 91, at 215; Butler, supra note 167, at 15–16.
169 FRANKE, supra note 91, at 214. 
170 Id. at 215 (“[T]he reform of divorce laws to allow for the distribution of assets at the 
end of a marriage in a way that is sensitive to wives’ economic vulnerability post-marriage 
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lesbian relationships.”171 Discussing an anecdotal same-sex couple’s dispute 
upon separation,172 Franke concludes that it “does [not] make sense to render 
these parties legible through a heteronormative lens, translating them into the 
more familiar stock characters that populate family court.”173 This feminist-
queer approach, while sensible and compelling in some situations, could end up 
hurting vulnerable parties in divorce who depend on marital dissolution rules 
for protection. Divorce exceptionalism should be treated with caution in the first 
wave of same-sex divorces because it is harmful to many vulnerable LGBT 
individuals.174
B. A Preference for Joint Custody 
A presumption, or at least strong judicial preference, for joint custody 
should guide the negotiation for same-sex divorce. In the United States, the 
maternal presumption has mostly given way to the pure best interest standard,175
and activists and organizations now lobby for a presumption of joint custody.176
                                                                                                                     
ironically reinforces the heterosexist structure of marriage more generally since the problems 
of inequality within marriage are to be ‘taken care of’ when marriages end. The feminist 
reforms to divorce law, in essence, take status inequalities within marriage as a given and, 
as a result, target reforms at the consequences of those entrenched inequities rather than at 
their source.”). 
171 Id. at 215–16.
172 Id. at 212–13 (describing the perspective of a lesbian couple going through a 
divorce—Beth, the higher earner and whom Franke describes as the “lesbian husband,” and 
Ruth, the lower earner who went in and out of the labor market, described as the “lesbian 
wife”). Beth felt that because she earned her money on her own, without the benefit of being 
a man, she should not have to share those assets with Ruth. Id. Ultimately, the judge 
understood the difference between the two women to still fall within the parameters of 
traditional gender, with Ruth entitled to receiving substantial assets from Beth during the 
marriage dissolution. Id.
173 Id. at 213 (adding that “this act of translation does violence to [the parties]” and “to 
lesbian relationships more generally”).
174 Notably, parties today in all types of marriages can arrange many of their issues 
through private ordering. They can enter prenuptial agreements and marital agreements that 
will typically be enforced by courts. See Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945 
(Ky. 1990) (demonstrating court’s willingness to enforce wife’s antenuptial agreement 
against her husband); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990) (finding prenuptial 
agreement was not void on grounds that the wife did not consult legal counsel prior to 
executing agreement). 
175 Children’s Bureau, supra note 122.
176 For an American Psychological Association paper endorsed by approximately 110 
researchers and practitioners in favor of the shared-parenting presumption, see Richard A. 
Warshak, Social Science and Parenting Plans for Young Children: A Consensus Report, 20 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 46, 59 (2014) (arguing that children receive the most benefit from 
joint-custody situations and concluding that, when suitable, shared-parenting should be the 
norm). In 2014, the National Parents Organization, which advocates for the shared-parenting 
presumption across the United States, put together a comprehensive report card that analyzed 
the status of child custody statutes in all fifty states, concluding that many states discriminate 
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Fathers’ rights activists argue that men suffer discrimination in divorce 
settings,177 and that a joint-custody presumption is an “essential element of the 
new ‘divorce bargain.’”178 Feminists have taken different positions on this issue. 
Many have expressed concern that a joint-custody presumption would reduce 
women’s bargaining power at divorce.179 Others support the presumption, 
focusing on its potential to relieve “divorced mothers of sole responsibility for 
childcare, undermining stereotypes about motherhood as women’s primary 
destiny, and, ideally, creating incentives for fathers to spend more time caring 
for children during marriage.”180 In the last few years, a number of states, to
varying degrees, have codified a shared-parenting presumption into law.181
More states may follow suit.182
Two aspects of same-sex divorces make them especially compelling for a 
joint-custody preference. First, as data discussed in Part II shows, the one area
in which behavioral patterns are clearly more egalitarian in same-sex couples is 
child-rearing. Second, while it is tough for anyone to bargain with the vague 
“best interest” standard,183 it is even more complicated in same-sex divorces 
where typically one of the spouses is a biological parent and the other is not.184
While biological connection to the child should not matter, as a matter of law, 
                                                                                                                     
against fathers in child custody. 2014 SHARED PARENTING REPORT CARD: A NEW LOOK AT 
CHILD WELFARE: A STATE-BY-STATE RANKING, NAT’L PARENTS ORG. (2014),
https://nationalparentsorganization.org/docs/2014_Shared_Parenting_Report_Card%2011-
10-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ3L-QSCS] (using four factors to determine if “best interest 
of the child” has actually resulted in equitable custody rights between fathers and mothers).
177 Mayeri, supra note 4, at 2331.
178 Id. at 2351–53 (describing the shared-parenting presumption as where “fathers 
receive[] custodial rights in exchange for fulfilling child support obligations”). 
179 Id. at 2352. 
180 Id. at 2351.
181 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.070 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02(B)
(2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(C)(2) (West Supp. 2017); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4)
(2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(a) (West Supp. 2015); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132
(2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(b)(9) (West Supp. 2016); MO ANN. STAT. § 452.340(7)
(2003 & West Supp. 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-21 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-10(1)(b) (2013 & LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
182 Jones, supra note 123 (“[A]bout 20 states are considering measurers that would 
change the laws governing which parent gets legal and physical control of a child after a 
divorce or separation.”). New York continues to debate this issue and has pending legislation 
to create a shared-parenting presumption. S. 2267, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S.
2577, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). Notably, some suggest that it is socioeconomic 
status (not gender) that explains the failure of some courts to grant joint custody. Rosin, 
supra note 123. Fathers who have access to more capital, and in turn, can afford continued 
legal representation, are in a better position to ask the court for custody than fathers who lack 
the financial capability. Id. Because asking for joint custody is cost-prohibitive, fathers tend 
to do it less, and that results in courts awarding custody to mothers more often. Id.
183 Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 4, at 969–71. 
184 See Goldberg et al., supra note 121, at 143–44; see also Gartrell et al., supra note 
126, at 581; Hertz et al., supra note 1, at 133. 
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for custody or visitation determinations, recent legal conflicts have shown that
this issue can lead to manipulative behavior in same-sex divorces.185 It is quite 
possible that a presumption or strong judicial preference for joint custody could 
deter such strategic behavior and improve the bargaining conditions for a 
vulnerable nonbiological parent in divorce. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
The legal homosexual has travelled a long way from Bowers v. Hardwick186
to Obergefell v. Hodges.187 From a moral bad actor—a sodomite—in Bowers,188
the legal homosexual is now the subject of “conferred dignity” when he or she 
marries.189 In this journey toward dignity, lesbians, gays, and bisexuals have 
taken on difficult legal struggles in which homosexuality has gradually, step-
by-step, been presented to courts and to the general public as less sexual, more 
monogamous, domestic, procreative, and finally dignified.190 Gays, lesbians, 
bisexuals, and transgender individuals have had to contest ugly stereotypes and 
convince the public and lawmakers that they are morally good people, and not 
moral deviants as they were once perceived.191 One of the good things we 
wanted everyone (ourselves included) to believe was that we model 
egalitarianism and can move the entire society towards this ideal. In so doing, 
we manufactured a myth about the inherent nature of our relationships. 
                                                                                                                     
185 The media is replete with situations where upon dissolution of a female same-sex 
relationship, the biological mother attempts to obtain full custody of a child on the basis that 
the child and nonbiological mom are not genetically related. See, e.g., Becca Habegger, 
Same-Sex Divorce, Custody Battle Could Set Precedent in TN, WUSA 9 (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/same-sex-divorce-custody-battle-could-set-precedent-
in-tn/255508803 [https://perma.cc/ACX7-82K3]; Joanne Kimberlin, Judge in Same-Sex 
Divorce Custody Case Rules Nonbiological Parent Has Parental Rights, VIRGINIAN-PILOT 
(Jan. 8, 2016), http://pilotonline.com/news/local/judge-in-same-sex-divorce-custody-case-rules-
nonbiological-parent/article_6270ec2c-b01a-5693-b312-7f67ce666ed9.html [https://perma.cc/
9KUB-VPGE]; John Leland, Parenthood Denied by the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/nyregion/after-a-same-sex-couples-breakup-a-custody-
battle.html [https://perma.cc/E3SS-AWKT]. The New York State Court of Appeals recently 
overturned over two decades of legal precedent when it held that nonbiological and non-
adoptive parents can seek visitation and custody when a couple separates. In re Brooke S.B. 
v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 502–03 (N.Y. 2016).
186 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (finding that sodomy laws do not 
violate the Due Process Clause), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
187 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608; Ben-Asher, supra note 41, at 283. 
188 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
189 Ben-Asher, supra note 41, at 283. 
190 Id. 
191 See, e.g., Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 387 U.S. 118, 118–19
(1967) (affirming deportation of a homosexual immigrant because federal law barred 
individuals “afflicted with psychopathic personality,” which the INS classified homosexuals 
as having). 
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Myths can energize nations, social movements, and individuals. Sometimes 
they come back to bite. This is happening now with the prevalent myth of 
egalitarianism in same-sex couples. This myth is haunting the first wave of 
same-sex divorces and harming vulnerable parties. Now that marriage equality 
is here, it is time to let go of myths about our moral goodness and focus on the 
real lives of LGBT people.
